Political influences and investors’ perceived risk: a preliminary study by Rusli M. N., et al.
Journal of Quality Measurement and Analysis   JQMA 14(2) 2018, 25-33  
Jurnal Pengukuran Kualiti dan Analisis 
POLITICAL INFLUENCES AND INVESTORS’ PERCEIVED RISK:  
A PRELIMINARY STUDY 
(Pengaruh Politik dan Tanggapan Risiko Pelabur: Suatu Kajian Awal) 
RUSLI M. N.1, MAMAT N. J. Z.2, MOHD SURADI N. R.2, MUSTAFA Z.2 & ZALINA M. A.2 
 
ABSTRACT 
The objective of the study is to discuss the effects of political influence on investors’ perceived 
risk under the political connected firms. Under the Malaysian political environment, relationship 
based of economic system which commonly practiced by most of the listed firms would enhance 
the needs of politician to participate as directors of the firm in order to ensure the firm’s survival 
in competitive industry. The effects of systematic exchange of favours between politician and 
firms has led to the arguments of political hypotheses in governance literature. As supported 
under the helping hand effects, empirical evidences have shown a favourable impact on firms 
accounting value and market based-performance due to the government favours and bailed-out 
to connected firms. However, the government obligations towards the people in social and 
political agenda have exacerbated the rent-seeking activities of political directors in realising 
the objectives. Moreover, due to the increasing number of cases reported involving high political 
figures in allegations of misallocation of firm’s resources and abuse of power in the 1MDB 
(1Malaysia Development Berhad), manipulation of stock figures and forgery of signatures of 
board members for a numbers of transactions in FGV (Felda Global Ventures Holdings Berhad), 
the credibility of politicians to perform his duties as firms’ director to maximising the 
shareholders’ wealth is questioned. As a consequence, a negative perception on the government 
may lead to inefficient capital market thus impair the investors’ confidence in future investment. 
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ABSTRAK 
Objektif kajian ini adalah untuk membincangkan kesan pengaruh politik terhadap tanggapan 
risiko pelabur dengan persekitaran politik dalam kalangan firma berkaitan. Dalam persekitaran 
politik di Malaysia, perkaitan hubungan ahli politik dalam sistem ekonomi oleh kebanyakan 
firma yang disenaraikan akan meningkatkan keperluan ahli politik untuk mengambil bahagian 
sebagai pengarah firma bagi memastikan kelangsungan firma dalam industri yang kompetitif. 
Kesan pertukaran pertimbangan yang sistematik antara ahli politik dan firma telah membawa 
kepada hujah-hujah hipotesis politik dalam literatur tadbir urus. Seperti yang disokong di bawah 
bantuan ‘kabel besar’, bukti empirikal telah menunjukkan kesan yang menggalakkan ke atas 
kedudukan firma dan prestasi berasaskan pasaran disebabkan oleh talian hayat kerajaan 
menyelamatkan firma yang berkaitan. Walau bagaimanapun, kewajipan asas kerajaan terhadap 
agenda sosial dan politik rakyat telah mencemarkan lagi untuk menempatkan ahli politik sebagai 
pengarah dalam merealisasikan objektif. Lebih-lebih lagi berikutan peningkatan bilangan kes 
yang dilaporkan melibatkan tokoh politik dalam dakwaan penyalahgunaan sumber dan dana 
firma dalam 1MDB (1Malaysia Development Berhad), manipulasi angka saham dan pemalsuan 
tandatangan ahli lembaga untuk beberapa transaksi dalam FGV (Felda Global Ventures 
Holdings Berhad), kredibiliti ahli politik dalam melaksanakan tugasnya sebagai pengarah firma 
untuk memaksimumkan kekayaan pemegang saham dipersoalkan. Akibatnya, persepsi negatif 
terhadap kerajaan mungkin menyebabkan pasaran modal yang tidak cekap itu menjejaskan 
keyakinan pelabur dalam pelaburan masa hadapan. 
Kata kunci: pertalian politik; tanggapan risiko; hipotesis politik 
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1. Introduction 
Most of East Asian countries, including Malaysia, are characterised by a relationship-based 
system where the informal relations between firms and fund provider is more important than a 
formal contract enforcement (Rajan & Zingales 1998). In Malaysia, the informal relationships 
between firms and fund provider is commonly found in family owned firms as the relatives’ 
supports are easy to obtain because it builds on trust between families. Another form of 
relationship-based argued by Rajan and Zingales (1998) is a good relationship between firm 
and banks that resulting to favourable term on financing facilities offer by the banks and such 
opportunity may be beneficial to firms with poor operating cash flows.  
The relationship-based system can also be explained in political context. Firms creating 
connections with political person or government officials might be a beneficial strategy for 
firms to stay sustainable in competitive industry nowadays. Since most of fundamental capital 
resources are controlled by the government, firms may need someone with political power to 
get an access on those resources thus increasing its value (Agrawal & Knoeber 2001). For 
instance, during the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98, financially distressed firms have seeking 
for government bailed-out and later becoming one of the government-linked companies (GLCs) 
through an equity ownership of such firms by the government (Johnson & Mitton 2003a; 
2003b). Since then, empirical studies have found that the connected firms performed more 
aggressively than non-connected firms since the bailed-out (Wu et al. 2012). Consistently 
supported under the helping hand theory, the intervention of government in business decisions 
may provide benefits to the firms thus enhance their performance.  
However, due to political hypothesis as proposed in most of governance studies, the 
existence of political director in firms as directors may perceived risky by investors if the 
grabbing hand effects are more dominant than the helping hand. Additionally, the inclining 
number of cases of corporate scandals involving politician in business decisions deflect the 
incompetence and unethical behaviours of political directors. The allegations of misallocation 
of resources and abuse of power by ex-Prime Minister in the 1Malaysia Development Berhad 
(1MDB) scandals in year 2015 has called attention of investors to highlight the needs of 
politician on the board since their existence in these cases may jeopardised the value of the firm 
thus perceived risky by investors. Therefore, in our preliminary study, we are going to give 
knowledge and literature on the effects of political hypothesis on connected firms which may 
affect the investors’ perceived risk.  
Furthermore, under the Malaysian environment, a relationship based economic system is a 
common practices done by most Malaysian firms. Since the grabbing hand effects may provide 
to unfavourable outcomes, the connected firms may be perceived risky than non-connected 
firms due to several reasons. First, the expropriation activities by political directors may harm 
the value of shareholders. Second, government bailed-out on politically connected firms 
(PCONS) particularly during the financial distress may not teach them to improve their 
governance system to be good as others. More factors provided from empirical studies will be 
discussed in section Review of Past Literatures.  
2. The Overview of Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
Previous scholars posit that the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 was occurred due to the 
unstable macroeconomic policies and vulnerable banking procedures that lead to fraudulent 
manoeuvres (Annuar 2014). However, the ineffectiveness of the corporate governance systems 
was partly blamed in causing the crisis to be widespread (Mitton 2002). The ineffectiveness in 
firm governance system was a consequence of several factors pertaining to market discipline 
such as high concentrated ownership, lack of participation of shareholders and weak 
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enforcement mechanisms (Haniffa & Hudaib 2006). Despite some early warnings by virtue of 
corporate scandals, it was not taken seriously enough by all market participants (Clarke 2000). 
As a response to the crisis, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) was 
introduced and incorporated into the listing requirements in 2001. The focus of the code is on 
monitoring and control of the board of directors particularly by the independent non-executive 
directors, shareholders and institutional investors. Later, the code was subsequently revised in 
2007 to further elucidate the importance of the board’s monitoring function and include 
suggestions of more active participation of directors in firm’s strategic plannings (Annuar 
2014). 
2.1. Independent directors of the board 
The needs for independent directors on the board arise due to the diversion of interest between 
managers and shareholders which resulting to unfavourable outcomes through high agency 
problems. Since empirical evidence has found the effectiveness of independent directors to 
mitigate the agency conflicts, regulators has clearly established the roles and responsibility of 
directors to discharge its fiduciary and leadership functions. Hence, a revision of MCCG in 
2012 from 2007, has enforced to strengthen the functions of independent directors by 
introducing the independent procedures and policies that must be fulfilled by all directors of 
the firms.  
Under the political perspective, the intervention of government in business decisions 
channelled via an appointment of politician as independent director of the firm. The 
independency level of such directors deflect check-and-balance mechanism to enhance board 
effectiveness through monitoring activities (Fama & Jensen 1983). Therefore, an increased 
level of board independence signals an increase in good governance practices of a firm. In 
addition to the definition, Darmadi (2011) referring Ararat et al. (2010) defined independent 
directors as a person who are free from any specific relationships with firm. They further stated 
that independent directors should neither have any privileges nor be the owner of more than 1% 
of shares in company. Likewise, such recommendations are consistently applied in Malaysia 
whereby the composition of independent directors in all listed firms should consist at least 33% 
or one third from the board size. 
3. Political Connection in Malaysia 
Faccio (2006) has documented a prevailing factor of political connections in business both in 
emerging and developed countries. However, such connections are more prominent in countries 
who practices relationship based economic system that creates a self-governing network of 
close connections among banks, politicians, government, and other stakeholders (Effiezal et al. 
2016). Under the Malaysian perspective, the political influence in most listed firms in Malaysia 
has exist since the formation of National Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970 and more significant 
later in year 1991 after the establishment of National Development Policy. The objective of 
these policies is to improve the issues on socio-economic imbalance between the ethnic groups 
in Malaysia immediately after independence in 1957. The increasing participation of Bumiputra 
in Malaysian corporate ownership and capital markets has signal preliminary efforts of 
government to politically interfere firm business decisions after a series of privatization and 
corporatization of some government departments leading to the formation of many public-listed 
companies (PLCs). The formation of new statutory bodies and GLCs to further assist the 
policies have established the widespread growth of political connections in Malaysian setting. 
As a result, the increasing number of PCONS firms has positively improve the capital market 
efficiency. Though the number of GLCs is relatively small, representing less than 10 percent of 
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the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia, these companies account for approximately MYR 260 
billion in market capitalization, or approximately 36 percent of the Bursa Malaysia market 
capitalization. Hence, the significant percentage of shares hold by GLCs are shown to influence 
the efficiency of capital market. 
However, Gomez and Jomo (1997) argue that the approach brought by the NEP was found 
to create a positive discrimination as the advantages only enjoyed by Bumiputras instead of the 
people as a whole. In addition, previous scholars also believe that the effects of NEP have 
promote cronyism (Gomez & Jomo 1997; Gul 2006; Johnson & Mitton 2003a), weak 
professional development (Effiezal et al. 2016), and poor management control in terms of 
executing government contracts (Hamid 2011). Until today, the high participation of politician 
in business decisions has evidenced PCONS as highly leveraged, poor enforcement to protect 
investors, and has a concentrated ownership and family firms (Effiezal et al. 2016). 
4. Review of Past Literatures 
Most of the literature that examined the effects of politics in business decisions lies on 
governance perspectives. Empirical evidence has examined the impact on firm performance 
and value (Fisman 2001; Goldman et al. 2009; Wu et al. 2012) the effects on financing 
decisions (Boubakri et al. 2012) and firm policy like dividend (Benjamin et al. 2016). However, 
there are still limited studies found to determine its impact under the Malaysian environment. 
Nevertheless, the arguments of political influence on business decisions are commonly being 
discussed under the political hypotheses, that is the effects of helping hand versus the grabbing 
hand. 
4.1. Helping hand effects on PCONS firms 
The effective roles of politician or government officials on the board as defined under the 
resource dependency theory, their contributions are similarly important for the networking and 
status capacity instead of skills, experience and expertise (Hamid 2011). Many prior scholars 
posit that politician or government officials on the board might be useful to have considerable 
access to government subsidies and lucrative government contracts (Gomez & Jomo 1997; 
Agrawal & Knoeber 2001; Goldman et al. 2009). The continuous efforts of government to 
supply subsidies and offer projects to PCONS may ensure the stability of returns being paid to 
shareholders thus eliminate the volatility of stock prices. In China, the government intervention 
in business activities shows a negative impact on firm value for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
but conditional for non-SOEs. According to Chen et al. (2017), the firm value increases initially 
at a lower level of connections and then begins to decrease at a higher level suggesting that 
higher level of connections has led to rent seeking activities that might outweigh the benefits.  
In other studies, PCONS firms are capable to utilise their political capacity to impose tariffs 
on competitors and enjoy reduced regulatory requirements at the same time (Agrawal & 
Knoeber 2001; Faccio 2006). As such, these may increase the economic barriers of non-PCONS 
firms to stay competitive in the market. In worst situation, the pressure received by non-
connected firms may push them to exit from the industry and leaving the connected firms under 
controlled. Such situations were found in Indonesia when import licenses are systematically 
awarded to firms connected with the Suharto regime at the expense of other firms in the same 
industry that are not politically connected (Mobarak & Purbasari 2006). 
Having connections with the government also may provide advantages to PCONS firms to 
obtain financial facilities from financial provider. For example, in Pakistan, the appointment of 
ex-politician as firms’ directors had given opportunity to connected firms to obtain loan with 
special interest rates (Johnson & Mitton 2003b; Khwaja & Mian 2005). The findings are 
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consistently found by Fu et al. (2017), that the connected firms in Indonesia raises the 
probability to receive the full amount of loan from banks and the results are more significant 
for SMEs firm. 
In access to equity financing, firms with a politically connected audit committee have better 
access to equity financing (Cho & Song 2017) thus providing them with lower cost of equity 
than non-connected peers (Ben-Nasr et al. 2012). 
Following tax perspective, PCONS also documented for paying less taxes than non-PCONS 
firms through its special tax deductions and tax-free government bailouts which resulting to 
lower effective taxes rates (Adhikari et al. 2006; Embong et al. 2012). The lower operating 
costs borne by the firms has provide them an excess of profit to be distributable to shareholders. 
Empirical evidence posit that the government bailed out for connected firms is more visible 
during the financial distress or economic downturn. Consistently proposed by Johnson and 
Mitton (2003a) which suggest that PCONs in Malaysia are more likely to be bailed-out by the 
government when they are suffering losses or during the economic recession. Equally, Boubakri 
et al. (2012) argues that when government does back up for such firms particularly to release 
them from monetary constraint, they are less sensitive to market competitions and pressure than 
comparable non-connected firms. As a result, they are financially better than firms who without 
connections (Wu et al. 2012). These arguments truly supported the evidence found in 
Singapore. Feng et al. (2004) posit that the PCONS firms is outperformed the non-PCONS 
firms in the areas of profitability, efficiency and financial returns thus these firms relatively 
claimed to be more transparent in corporate governance practices and play effective role as 
directors and managers. In the study, PCONs are measured based on the percentage of 
government ownership in the companies. 
The conclusion of helping hand effects to connected firms leads to a low market-wide risk 
in overall exposure during the economic downturns, thus enhance the stability of the share price. 
Hence, the effects of helping hand as abovementioned may eliminate the investors’ perceived 
risk. 
4.2. Grabbing hand effects in PCONS firms 
Prior studies have found that having close ties with the governments may not always benefit 
the firms as the governments may have obligations towards the people which are depart of 
value-maximizing objectives and shareholders’ wealth maximization. Academic researchers 
argue that governments use firms’ resources to benefit their cronies and supporters, who in turn 
provide votes, political contributions, and bribes (Bushman et al. 2004; Gul 2006; Al-Dhamari 
& Ku Ismail 2015). They further argue that politicians seeking to establish relationships with 
firms because they wanted to control and use the firms to achieve their political goals. The 
power gained by the politicians to extract political benefits at the expense of other stakeholders 
in the firm may impact on firm’s reputation and performance. A rent-seeking activities by the 
politician or government officials on the board through their autocratic power in decision 
making may lead to value-decreasing of PCONs. Such reciprocal relationship due to the 
systematic exchange of favour between firms and politician may jeopardise firms’ value thus 
increasing the agency conflicts.  
The grabbing hand effects of connected firms are commonly discussed in governance 
literature and still debating. Most of empirical evidence documented a poor governance 
practices among PCONS firms increases the agency conflicts through expropriation activities 
at the expense of stakeholders’ benefits. For instance, In China, the expropriation activities of 
controlling owners through self-dealing and tunnelling are more pronounced in PCONs 
compared to non-connected firms. They further argue that the ineffective roles of government 
to support business is more prominent in countries with weak legal and regulatory protections 
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of minority shareholders (Qian et al. 2011). This arguments supported the earlier studies done 
by (Gomez & Jomo 1997) that the connected firms will tend to misallocate some of firms’ 
resources which consequently impair the investors’ confidence to further in future investment. 
Even if they do, investors will require higher return from the firms for holding an excess risk 
from the investment portfolio, hence, detrimental the firm’s earnings quality. 
The arguments of adverse impact on firm’s performance by poor governance practices of 
PCONS is supported by Chen et al. (2009). The misalignment of interest between the politically 
connected directors on the board and their shareholders exacerbate the rent seeking behaviour 
through misallocation of firm’s resources to realise their political and social agenda. 
Consequently, the expropriation activities have resulting to lower share price compared to other 
non-connected firms.   
 Another expropriation activity normally practices by PCONs under an effective governance 
system is to squander the excess cash in projects that maximize the managers’ wealth at the 
expense of outside investors (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990). According to Al-Dhamari and Ku 
Ismail (2015), the characteristics of emerging market particularly in protecting minority 
shareholders is poor (La Porta et al. 1998), the government intervention is high and poor 
governance system (Bhattacharyay 2004), the controlling managers (in this case controlling 
shareholders in Malaysia) are tend to take advantage from retained cash reserves at the expense 
of minority by investing the free cash in destructive activities (Hamid 2011). Hence, it leads to 
a potential crash of firm price. 
In a similar vein, a case in Indonesia reported by Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), suggest 
that PCONS choose not to be cross listed on U.S. markets because it will increase the difficulties 
for PCONS to extract private benefits due to high requirements of cross-listing. This further 
suggest that PCONs were suffer more agency conflicts due to expropriation activities at the 
expense of minority shareholders.  
Furthermore, Bertrand et al. (2007) posit that PCONs in France exhibit lower profits than 
non-connected firms, especially in elections years and during politically contested areas. The 
authors explain this lower profitability by the higher rates of job creation and plant creation 
around elections aimed to secure more supporting votes. Another recent study that found to 
affect firms bottom line is done by Fan and Chen (2017) which they found higher effective tax 
rate among connected firms than non-connected peers. They argued that the PCONS directors 
in China are worked for the interests of the government and restrict the firms’ tax planning 
activities. However, the findings are not consistently found by Adhikari et al. (2006). They 
argue that the relationship-based economic system practices by firms in Malaysia has provide 
the listed firms with special tax deductions and tax-free government bailouts which resulting to 
a lower effective rate. 
In line with arguments advocated by grabbing hand theory that suggests government rent 
seeking activities may exacerbate the agency conflicts through misalignment of interest 
between the PCONS directors and managers. Due to the deviation of objectives between the 
political and business orientation may in turn placed firms in a risky position that the allocation 
of firms resources may be allocated to realise the PCONS directors obligation towards the 
people instead of maximising the wealth of shareholders through dividend. As a consequence, 
firms who having connection with the government may seems to be less attractive and risky 
resort to generate better return in the future. 
Additionally, the multiple obligations of politician towards the party and community may 
strengthened the arguments of rent seeking behaviour of political directors that may jeopardised 
the investors value and were financially perceived risk (Chang & Wong 2004). 
The issue of stock price crash of Felda Group Ventures (FGV), Malaysian Airlines (MAS), 
misuse of power by Tabung Haji and Employee Provident Fund (EPF), misallocation of fund 
and resources of 1MDB by high political individual in few years back has called attention to 
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highlight the needs of politician on the board since their existence in these cases may 
jeopardised the value of the firm. Furthermore, the increasing number of corruption cases as 
discussed above has questioned the roles of politician to provide their helping hand to mitigate 
the impact of uncertainty thus perceived less risk than non-connected firms. 
5. Conclusions 
The increasing number of cases in corporate scandals involving politician as directors in firms 
has called attention to investors to highlight the needs of politician on the board since their 
existence in these cases may jeopardised the value of the firm thus perceived risky by investors. 
The appointment of politician as directors of the firm was made to ensure that the helping hand 
of the government is continuously provided to guarantee the survival of the firms. As such, the 
demand for participation of politician as directors of the firms may increase hence, it could be 
part of the corporate strategy for firms’ long term benefits. However, government participation 
would demand company to serve political and social obligations as politician is bound with 
those obligations which could jeopardise the shareholders’ value (Chang & Wong 2004). The 
impact would be more severe if such appointment was made due to their power to obtain capital 
resources from the government (Hamid 2011) instead of the academic qualification and 
experience in business. In conjunction to this matter, this scenario may highlight the needs of 
politician to participate in business as their existence as directors in firms may resulting to 
inconsistent impact on firms’ value. 
Therefore, this study may intend to investigate the effects of political influence on investors’ 
perceived risk under the political hypotheses among connected firms. Under a unique 
environment of Malaysia, a multi-racial country that shape the political party and the efficiency 
of capital market (Abdul Wahab et al. 2016) may create a motivation for the researcher to 
further contributes to the body of knowledge and scarcity of empirical evidence in the field.  
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